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1 Introduction
When people care about their relative standing in society the labor market is likely to produce
inefficient outcomes (Frank, 2005, 2008). Conspicuous consumption often emerges as an instru-
ment to signal social status (Schor, 1998), typically resulting in social waste (Howarth, 1996,
2006). Beyond conspicuous consumption taxes,1 labor income taxes have also gained attention
as instrument to mitigate these inefficiencies but their efficacy has been shown to depend on the
degree of pre-tax inequality in wages or earning potentials (Ireland, 1994, 1998).2 Moreover, the
outcome of tax policies in the presence of concerns for status has been shown to crucially depend
on the shared norms that determine how one’s social status is assigned (Clark and Oswald, 1998;
Brekke et al., 2003; Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2008, 2012). Therefore, in order to assess the efficacy
of income taxes to mitigate wasteful conspicuous consumption, both the pre-tax wage inequality
and the notion of social status should be considered in the analysis. To the best of our knowledge
this has not been done so far. In the present paper we attempt to fill this gap.
We study a model where social status depends on relative labor income, and where agents can
only observe the overall distribution of incomes and the amount of income spent on an otherwise
useless conspicuous good. This induces a signalling game of conspicuous consumption where
the amount of income earned plays the twofold role of generating social status and granting
the purchasing power required for the signal. We stress that this feature of our model is an
absolute novelty in the literature relating social status to signalling games where, typically, status
is generated by an exogenously given resource (for a recent survey see Truyts, 2010). So income is
desired not only for its inconspicuous value and because it allows to buy the conspicuous signal,
but also because it affects the value of status itself.
The analysis is divided in two parts. In the first part, we study the consequences of a labor
income tax under ordinal status – i.e., when people care only about their rank in the distribution
of labor incomes. This notion of social status is widely applied in applications (see, e.g., Frank,
1985a,b; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2006, 2009; Corneo and Jeanne, 1998, 1997, 1999). Consistently
with both Ireland (1998) and Corneo (2002) we show that, when status is ordinal, much depends
on the pre-tax wage distribution. More precisely, while low income (low wage) people are always
made better off by the introduction of a labor income tax, the implications for high income (high
wage) people and social waste in conspicuous consumption depend on the degree of inequality
in the wage distribution. If the wage distribution is highly unequal then waste is increased and
high income people are made worse off. If the wage distribution is quite unequal then waste is
decreased but high income people are still made worse off. Finally, if the wage distribution is only
mildly unequal then waste is decreased substantially and high income people are made better off.
The main finding here is that, when status is ordinal, labor income taxes and wage inequality are
substitutes in mitigating wasteful conspicuous consumption.
1 Taxing conspicuous consumption can lead to welfare improvements by reducing socially wasteful activities (Frank,
1985b; Ng, 1987; Ireland, 1994). See also Viard and Carroll (2012) on progressive consumption taxation, and Pagano
and Vatiero (2017) for other remedies to wasteful consumption activities.
2 Bilancini and D’Alessandro (2012) and Heikkinen (2015) show that, in the presence of both concerns for social status
and utility-enhancing social activities that require time, welfare can be increased by reducing consumption, work and
growth, possibly through income taxation.
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In the second part of the paper, we analyze the consequences of a labor income tax when
status is not ordinal but cardinal – i.e., when people also care about how far other people are
in the distribution of incomes. Cardinal status encompasses many notions of status applied
in the literature that are not ordinal, such as relative deprivation (see Runciman, 1966, for the
original notion, and Stark and Taylor, 1989, for its relevance to migration), difference from mean
consumption (see the seminal contribution by Duesenberry, 1949, and Harbaugh, 1996, for a
more recent contribution explaining the growth-savings paradox), ratio to mean consumption (see
Cooper et al., 2001, for a growth model with decreasing utility over time, and Ljungqvist and
Uhlig, 2000, for a productivity-shock driven model of an economy with a procyclical optimal
tax policy), and upward-looking comparisons (see Bowles and Park, 2005, and Oh et al., 2012,
about Veblen effects on work hours).3 We find that, under cardinal status, the relationship between
the inequality of pre-tax wages and the change in waste induced by an income tax is, in general,
non-monotonic. One source of difficulty here is that a variety of reasonable specifications of
cardinal status are possible, and not all of them share the same qualitative relationship between
pre-tax wage inequality and the change in waste. To make sense out of this complexity, we provide
a qualitative map of such a relationship, identifying the main cases on the basis of the relative
importance of the cardinal characteristics of social status. The main finding here is that, under
cardinal status, labor income taxes and wage inequality need not be substitutes but, actually, they
can be complements in mitigating wasteful conspicuous consumption.
Our analysis provides a number of findings showing that the case of cardinal status is qualita-
tively rather different from the case of ordinal status. First, under cardinal status a labor income
tax can be Pareto improving even if pre-tax wages are extremely unequal. Second, even in the
presence of small differentials in pre-tax wage rates – a case which leads to a reduction in waste
under ordinal status – the amount of waste in signalling and the total amount of work may increase.
Third, since a greater signalling induces high income individuals to earn more by requiring them
to work more, this outcome can potentially make low income individuals worse off – as they may
fall behind rich individuals even further – notwithstanding the fact that they command a greater
income and work longer hours. Fourth, under cardinal status the value of status is intrinsically
endogenous (since incomes are endogenous) so that conspicuous consumption indirectly affects
the value of status by affecting the choice of how much to work (hence, how much income to earn).
This potentially gives rise to a vicious cycle: more conspicuous consumption leads to more income
which in turn asks for more conspicuous consumption.
Overall, these results suggest that any policy relying on an income tax which aims at mitigating
wasteful conspicuous consumption should carefully consider what is the pre-tax wage inequality
and what are ruling social norms that determine status. Indeed, a policy of substantial income
taxation might appear to be ineffective when pre-tax wage inequality is strong if social status is
believed to be ordinal, while actually it could be very effective if status is cardinal.
3 An important issue when status is cardinal pertains to the convexity/concavity of status concerns, i.e., whether status
increases at an increasing/decreasing rate (see Clark and Oswald, 1998, for an application to conformity behavior). This
plays a crucial role in the sociological literature, where combining status considerations with comparison processes
(according to Homans, 1974, status and comparison are the big sociological forces together with power) yields a variety
of shapes of cardinal status, exhibiting either positive or negative second derivative of the status function (see Sorensen,
1979 and, more recently, Jasso, 2008).
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we relate our contribution to the literature
on income taxation when people have status concerns. In section 3 we describe the baseline model,
providing the technical results which are required for our analysis. In section 4 we study the case
of ordinal status, while in section 5 we study the case of cardinal status. Section 6 provides our
conclusions and final remarks. All proofs are reported in the Appendix.
2 Income taxation under status concerns
The first contribution to investigate the desirability of a labor income tax under concerns for social
status is the seminal book by Duesenberry (1949) where an entire chapter is devoted to proving
that, if individuals care about the ratio between their consumption and a weighted average of
others’ consumption, then an income tax may be desirable also for efficiency purposes. After a
period of silence, Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) were the first to tackle the issue again. Assuming
that people directly care about relative consumption, they find that welfare maximization requires
higher linear taxes. This result has been later generalized by Oswald (1983) to non-linear tax
rules.4 Both studies rely on a welfare function to establish optimal tax schedules, hence taking
into consideration also equity issues. Such a welfarist approach has not been followed by Persson
(1995) who has showed that, under assumptions similar to Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and
Oswald (1983), a linear income tax can induce a Pareto improvement. We too constrain the analysis
to efficiency issues.
Ireland (1994, 1998) has been the first to study a model of social status signalling through
conspicuous consumption. In this setup, if people care about their rank in the distribution of
income, an appropriate linear taxation policy can generate a Pareto improvement. In particular, if
the range of pre-tax earning capabilities is not too large, then a Pareto improving income tax exists
in which the poor gain from redistribution and the rich gain from a reduction in the expenditure
required to signal their status.5 An important difference between our model and the models by
Ireland (1994, 1998) is that in the latter status is assumed to depend on the distribution of the
gross earning potential – i.e., individual productivity, which is exogenous to the model – while in
our model status is assumed to depend on the distribution of incomes that are actually earned by
individuals – which is endogenous because depends on the individual decision of how much to
work. We think that if concerns for status can be legitimately thought of as hardwired, then it can
be reasonable to assume that social status depends on the distribution of gross earning potentials
(see Rayo and Becker, 2007; Samuelson, 2004, for a discussion on why Nature may want people to
have status concerns). However, if concerns for status are thought of as instrumental, i.e., arising
because status provides the means for something else (as in, e.g., Cole et al., 1992, 1998), then
actually earned income seems a more appropriate status-bearing asset6 (see Postlewaite, 1998, for a
4 Importantly, Oswald (1983) shows that the results of Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) – that both the most and the
least productive individual should not be taxed – are not robust to the introduction of relative concerns.
5 In Ireland (1994) it is also shown that universal benefits in cash or in kind can mitigate the waste due to signalling –
although things are made more complex by means-testing because of its informational value.
6 A common idea is that status depends on the current level of income or consumption, the so-called relative income
hypothesis (see Clark et al., 2008, and references therein). Otherwise, social status may depend on the distribution of
wealth (e.g., Robson, 1992). There may be also non-economic determinants of social status, as it is pointed out in the
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discussion of the advantages of the instrumental approach).7 A further added value of our approach
is that it allows us to take into account the – possibly perverse – effects of income redistribution
on status and, hence, on waste. This could not be done properly in Ireland (1994, 1998) since, in
equilibrium, social status is determined by exogenous individual characteristics.8
Truyts (2012) provides a new argument for differential indirect taxation when consumers use
consumption to communicate their status to others. In particular, the goods used for signaling only
can be taxed without burden while a Ramsey rule characterizes optimal taxes when goods are used
for both signaling and intrinsic consumption. An alternative policy is explored by Goerke (2013):
mandatory profit sharing can be Pareto-improving if labour supply is excessive due to relative
consumption effects. In particular, If the rise in profit income keeps total income constant, then
there is a Pareto-improving substitution effect.
Finally, one can consider our contribution as a robustness test of the basic findings on optimal
labor income taxation when we allow for different notions of social status. Recently, other
important robustness tests have been conducted, although along different lines of generalization,
e.g., Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) study optimal non-linear income taxation when
revenue can be spent on public goods.9
3 The model
Our model is an extension of the one developed in Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012), that in turn
resembles the model in Bagwell and Bernheim (1996). The novelty here is that the status-bearing
asset is labor income and, therefore, it is endogenously determined. This turns out to be a non-trivial
modification of the model, allowing us to study how the notion of status affects the optimality of
policies regarding the taxation and redistribution of labor income.
There is a population of agents consisting of two types – one with high labor productivity,
the other with low labor productivity – and whose income entirely depends on labor earnings,
obtained in a competitive labor market. Hereafter, the subscript h will be used to refer to the
sociological literature, where education and occupation typically play an important role (Fershtman and Weiss, 1993;
Fershtman et al., 1996). Recently, Gallice and Grillo (2018) assume that status is determined by both consumption
levels and social class, the latter capturing the set of socioeconomic characteristics that affect the individual’s social
standing after controlling for his productivity/income.
7 Consider, for instance, the case where status concerns are driven by concerns for the quality of social interactions
(as in Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996). Owing to the instrumental approach it must be that the quality of interactions
depends positively on status because people get more benefits by interacting with high status people. If we restrict to
labor income as the source of such benefits then it seems reasonable to assume that benefits depend on consumption
externalities. Hence, net earned income seems a better candidate than gross earning potential as the status-bearing asset
– a person with a large potential that earns nothing cannot provide benefits to peers in terms of consumption.
8 The setup of Ireland (1998) is also applied in Ireland (2001) to study the desirability of tax progressivity in the case
of quasi-linear preferences (see also Corneo, 2002, on this).
9 Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) analyze how optimal income taxation changes when we also consider
capital accumulation and the possibility of capital taxation. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013) consider the
case where the importance of conspicuous consumption increases with leisure because it leads to greater consumption
visibility. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015) deal with optimal nonlinear income taxation in an international
setting, where consumers care about their relative consumption compared both with locals and people abroad.
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highly productive type while the subscript l will be used to refer to the lowly productive type.10 A
fraction β ∈ (0,1) of population is of l-type agents and a fraction (1−β ) 6= 0 is of h-type agents.
Let wh be the productivity of h-types and wl the productivity of l-types, with wh > wl > 0. The
time endowment is Z > 0 and is the same for everyone. Individuals are identical under any other
respect.
Time can be allocated to either working or leisure while income can be allocated to the
consumption of either a conspicuous or an inconspicuous good. The price of the inconspicuous
good is normalized to 1; since the price of the conspicuous good is not going to play any relevant
role, it too is normalized to 1. Leisure is indicated with z, inconspicuous consumption with
c and conspicuous consumption with x. Furthermore, we posit that one’s productivity, leisure
and inconspicuous consumption are all unobservable to other individuals while conspicuous
consumption is observable.
Following, e.g., Corneo (2002), utility is assumed to be additive in three components measuring
the individual benefits accruing from, respectively, inconspicuous consumption, leisure and status:
U(c,z,s) = ln(c)+a ln(z)+ s , (1)
where a> 0 represents the relative importance of leisure with respect to inconspicuous consumption
and social status. A couple of remarks on the utility function are worth doing. First, the conspicuous
good does not generate utility directly: it serves only as a signal for labor income, and hence as
the means to gain status. Second, the utility from inconspicuous consumption and leisure are
assumed to be logarithmic. This is done because it allows us to keep the analysis tractable and
more transparent. More precisely, when utility is logarithmic, and in the absence of status-seeking
effects, an income tax leads to income and substitution effects on leisure which offset each other;
this makes computations easier and allows us to isolate the impact of status-seeking behavior.
The component s is assumed to depend on how individual income compares to the overall
income distribution. Let φ be an income (cumulative) distribution on [0,Zwh] – the range of feasible
incomes – and let y be an income in [0,Zwh]. We write s(φ ,y) for the status of an individual who
is believed to possess income y when the overall distribution of incomes in the population is φ . If
individual incomes were public information, then there would have been no gain by conspicuous
consuming. However, the income of every individual is private information.11 So, in order to
attain status, individuals engage in a signalling activity by consuming the conspicuous good x.
More precisely, we denote with µ the belief function so that µ(x) indicates the believed pair (φ ,y),
i.e., the distribution φ of incomes and a particular income y for the sender of signal x. Status is
then given by s(µ(x)).12 To rule out unreasonable situations, we assume that when signal x is
10 We note that the presence of just two types is by no means crucial to our results (see on this, for instance, the model
with a continuum of types in Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004).
11 We note that there are sectors where individual income is more likely to be public information; think of, e.g., CEOs,
artists and entertainers, civil servants. Our analysis does not apply to cases where job reveals income, unless there are
reasons to believe that job is not publicly observable.
12 Alternatively, we might let status depend on the distribution of income net of the expenditure in signalling. Such a
possibility has been explored, in a different setup, in Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012). We note that in the current model
such an assumption does not represent a conceptual difficulty since, differently from Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012),
the value of status is already endogenous.
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observed, µ necessarily assigns to it an income that allows to buy x. This entails that beliefs might
never provide strong out-of-equilibrium penalties, jamming the signalling. To rule this out, we
also assume that an individual never finds it profitable to buy more x if this implies that he will be
believed to spend his entire income on x.
In the spirit of Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008, 2012), we study how the model predictions
change when different notions of status are employed. In particular, we focus on two classes
of status functions which have received attention from the literature, namely ordinal status and
cardinal status. When status is ordinal people have concerns only for their rank in the distri-
bution of incomes. Therefore, s(φ ′,y′) = s(φ ,y) if φ(y) = φ ′(y′) and φ−(y) = limyˆ→y− φ(yˆ) =
limyˆ→y′− φ(yˆ) = φ ′−(y′).13 When status is cardinal, instead, people are also interested in features
of the income distribution other than from rank. For instance, under cardinal status it is likely to
have s(φ ′,y)< s(φ ,y) when φ ′ first-order stochastically dominates φ over the range [0,y) and both
distributions are identical for higher incomes, even if the rank of an individual with income y is
the same in φ ′ and φ . We also assume that s is bounded above, i.e., that the value of status cannot
explode.14
Finally, a linear tax τ ≥ 0 is levied on income and its revenue is equally distributed to all
individuals by means of a lump sum transfer T . Incomes of l-type agents and h-type agents are
denoted by yi = (1− τ)wi(Z− zi)+T , with i = l,h. The hypothesis of balanced budget implies
that T = τ (βyl +(1−β )yh), as average pre-tax and post-tax income are equal.
The decision problem of a generic individual of type i, with i = h, l, can be described as:
max
c,z,x
[ln(c)+a ln(z)+ s(µ(x))], s.t. c+ x≤ yi . (2)
Since the budget constraint must hold with equality, (2) can be restated as:
max
z,x
[ln(wi(Z− z)(1− τ)− x+T )+a ln(z)+ s(µ(x))] . (3)
We derive the optimal leisure for given s and x, and we obtain that:15
z =
a
1+a
(
T − x
wi(1− τ) +Z
)
. (4)
Next step is to choose an appropriate equilibrium concept for the model. We focus on symmet-
ric Nash equilibria in pure strategies with consistent beliefs. A vector (z∗l ,x
∗
l ,z
∗
h,x
∗
h,µ
∗) is an
equilibrium if and only if:
1. (z∗i ,x
∗
i ) maximizes utility of type i given µ∗, i = l,h;
2. beliefs are consistent:
(a) if x∗l 6= x∗h then µ∗(x∗l ) = (y∗l ,φ ∗) and µ∗(x∗h) = (y∗h,φ ∗) ,
13 We use φ(y) and φ−(y) to distinguish between, respectively, individuals with not greater income and with strictly
less income.
14 For a more detailed and formal definition of ordinal and cardinal status using income distributions see Bilancini and
Boncinelli (2014).
15 The logarithmic shape of the utility function rules out corner solutions, provided that s is bounded.
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(b) if x∗l = x
∗
h then µ
∗(x∗l ) = µ
∗(x∗h) = (βy
∗
l +(1−β )y∗h,φ ∗) ;
where y∗l = (1− τ)wl(Z− z∗l )+T , y∗h = (1− τ)wh(Z− z∗h)+T , and φ ∗ is the distribution where a
fraction β of population earns y∗l and a fraction (1−β ) of population earns y∗h. To allow better
readability of formulas, we set L = s(y∗l ,φ
∗) and H = s(y∗h,φ
∗). Given φ ∗, being considered to
earn y∗h is assumed to provide a higher status than being considered to earn y
∗
l , namely H > L. We
also assume that L = s(y∗l ,φ
∗) and H = s(y∗h,φ
∗) are continuous in φ ∗ as long as y∗l 6= y∗h, namely
that changing slightly either y∗l or y
∗
h (or both) of an entire population of types changes the value of
status only slightly if incomes are different.
The above definition of equilibrium imposes only weak restrictions on out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. In particular, beliefs are only required to be such that a deviation is not profitable for both
l-type and h-type individuals. This great freedom in the choice of beliefs off the equilibrium path
determines the existence of many pooling and separating equilibria, as in a standard signalling
game. In order to get rid of this large multiplicity, and to have a unique prediction to use in
comparative statics exercises, we adapt to the current setup the so-called Riley equilibrium, which
is widely accepted as prominent equilibrium concept in signalling theory (see, e.g., Riley, 2001).
Basically, the Riley equilibrium is the separating equilibrium where the waste in signalling is
minimal. In particular, in this paper we focus on the situation where the lower income group
spends nothing on signalling and the higher income group spends on signalling the minimum
amount which makes a deviation not profitable for the lower income group. Unlike standard
signalling models, in our setup the asset to be signalled, i.e., income, is not exogenously fixed,
and either type of individuals can in principle end up with the largest asset, i.e., with the highest
income. Proposition 1 establishes that a Riley equilibrium exists and that it is such that the lower
income group is composed of l-type individuals while the higher income group is composed of
h-type individuals. Furthermore, Proposition 1 provides the equilibrium values of conspicuous
consumption and leisure for both l-types and h-types, as well as the equilibrium lump sum transfer
under balanced budget.
PROPOSITION 1. The Riley equilibrium exists, and at such equilibrium l-types are indifferent
between following their equilibrium behavior and their best alternative that entails mimicking
h-types. Furthermore, the following must hold:
y∗h > y
∗
l , (5)
x∗l = 0 , (6)
x∗h =
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
[wl(1− τ)Z+T ] , (7)
z∗l =
a
1+a
(
T
wl(1− τ) +Z
)
, (8)
z∗h =
a
1+a
Te L−H1+a +
(
e
L−H
1+a −1
)
(1− τ)Zwl
wh(1− τ) +Z
 , (9)
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T =
τ(1− τ)Z
[(
(1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
+β
)
wl +(1−β )wh
]
(1+a)(1− τ)+ τa
(
β +(1−β )e L−H1+a
) . (10)
For the sake of notation simplicity, from now on we will write x∗ instead of x∗h.
4 Wasteful consumption under ordinal status
We begin our analysis by considering the case where status is ordinal: H and L are fixed values
that do not depend on yl and yh.16 Differentiating (7), (8) and (9) with respect to τ we get:
dx∗
dτ
=
(
1− e L−H1+a
)(dT
dτ
−wlZ
)
1
p
, (11)
dz∗l
dτ
=
a
(1+a)
1
wl(1− τ)2
(
dT
dτ
(1− τ)+T
)
. (12)
dz∗h
dτ
=
a
(1+a)
e
L−H
1+a
wh(1− τ)2
(
dT
dτ
(1− τ)+T
)
. (13)
From (10), (11) and (13) we obtain the following preliminary results, which allow to relate the
effect of an increase in income tax with earning potentials.
RESULT 1. A greater income tax reduces the waste in conspicuous consumption if and only if
dT/dτ < wlZ.
RESULT 2. If dT/dτ < wlZ at τ = 0, then dT/dτ < wlZ for all τ ∈ [0,1].
From result 1 we see that a greater income tax decreases total waste in conspicuous consumption if
and only if the earning potential of l-types, wlZ, is greater than the change in the transfer induced
by the increase in τ . Note also that dT/dτ < wlZ is equivalent to saying that the inconspicuous
consumption of l-types has to diminish as a result of the increase in τ .
Moreover, Result 2 implies that if the introduction of a marginal labor income tax is waste
reducing, then any further increase in the tax entails a further reduction in waste. The reason is that
the marginal change in the amount of income transferred from h-types to l-types is bound to be
smaller than its value at τ = 0. This is because, under homothetic preferences, a flat labor income
tax always decreases total income and, hence, a rising tax rate can only add a decreasing amount
of income to the lump sum transfer.
For the rest of this section the analysis focuses on introducing income taxation when τ = 0.
This greatly simplifies the analysis and, most importantly, in the light of Result 2 it allows to take a
conservative perspective on waste reduction. Under τ = 0 the condition dT/dτ < wlZ is satisfied
if and only if
wh
wl
< 1+a
(
β
1−β + e
L−H
1+a
)
≡ σx . (14)
16 Ordinal status is widely applied in economics, starting from Frank (1985b) (see Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004;
Haagsma and van Mouche, 2010; Stark, 2017, for recent contributions exploiting the ordinal properties of status).
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This shows that there is an upper bound to the degree of wage inequality for which introducing an
income tax helps reducing waste.17
The next step is to study how the introduction of an income tax affects the equilibrium income
of l-types and h-types. This is relevant in itself for obvious reasons, but for what matters here it
helps to better understand the effects of the tax on individuals’ utility.
RESULT 3. A greater income tax increases l-types’ equilibrium income if and only if dT/dτ > wlZ.
Moreover, a greater income tax always decreases the equilibrium income of h-types.
From result 2 and 3 we see that an income tax decreases waste if and only if it decreases the
equilibrium income of l-types. This is because a lower income makes l-types compete less fiercely
for status – signalling becomes more costly for them – and, hence, it allows h-types to spend less in
order to differentiate themselves from l-types. Then, from condition (14) we see that wh/wl < σx
implies that l-types’ income decreases while wh/wl > σx implies that l-types’ income increases.
Result 3 also clarifies the impact of a greater tax rate on the income of h-types. The intuition is
the following. When l-types’ income decreases, h-types find it profitable to decrease their income
as well since they experience a lower net wage and they need less conspicuous consumption to
differentiate themselves from l-types. When instead the income of l-types increases, then h-types
spend more on conspicuous consumption but, because of the reduced net wage, they find it optimal
to reduce their inconspicuous consumption even more. Consequently, a greater tax rate always
makes the rich poorer. Importantly, in the next section we will show that this result only holds
under ordinal status.
We now turn our attention to individuals’ utility. Differentiating utility functions at equilibrium
with respect to τ we obtain
dUl
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=0
=
(1+a)
wlZ
dT
dτ
−1 , (15)
dUh
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=0
= −1+
e
L−H
1+a (1+a)
dT
dτ
whZ−
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
wlZ
. (16)
By imposing (15) and (16) to be positive we get the following inequalities, respectively
wh
wl
> 1−a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
≡ σl , (17)
wh
wl
< 1+
e
L−H
1+a (1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
1− e L−H1+a (1−β )
≡ σh . (18)
By combining conditions (14), (17) and (18) we obtain the following:18
17 Note that for a > 0 the right hand side of (14) is larger than unity meaning that there always exists a range of wh/wl
such that a waste reduction is possible. We also note that an increase in a raises σx, which means that when relative
importance of leisure is higher the introduction of an income taxation is more likely to be waste reducing.
18 Note that for a > 0 inequality (17) is always satisfied as the right hand side is strictly smaller than one. Moreover, for
a > 0 the right hand side of (18) is strictly greater than one as the second term is positive. This implies that there is a
range of wage distributions where a marginal increase of τ makes everyone strictly better off.
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PROPOSITION 2. The introduction of a marginal income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed
makes l-types better off. Moreover, it generates:
i) less waste and a higher utility for h-types, if wh/wl < σh;
ii) less waste and a lower utility for h-types, if σh < wh/wl < σx;
iii) greater waste and a lower utility for h-types, if wh/wl > σx.
The proof of the Proposition can be found in the Appendix – it substantially consists of demon-
strating that σh < σx. Figure 1 shows the three relevant intervals of the wage distribution.
- wh
wl
1σl ︸ ︷︷ ︸
waste decreased
l-types better off
h-types better off
σh︸ ︷︷ ︸
waste decreased
l-types better off
h-types worse off
σx︸ ︷︷ ︸
waste increased
l-types better off
h-types worse off
Figure 1: The effects of a marginal increase in τ as a function of wh/wl .
Further insights can be obtained by looking at how σx and σh vary in response to changes in
the exogenous parameters of the model, i.e., a, β , L−H, and Z. From (14), (17) and (18) we
immediately see that Z plays no role at all. The reason is that types have identical endowments and
homothetic preferences – changes in Z only have scale effects which leave σx and σh unaffected.
So, we could normalize Z (e.g., by setting Z = 1), as we did for the prices of the conspicuous good,
without any substantial loss of generality. However, as it will become clear in the next section,
this holds for ordinal status but not for cardinal status, so we prefer not to normalize Z to better
compare results in the two cases.19
A larger status differential H−L, i.e., a larger net benefit of being considered rich instead
of poor, induces a smaller σx. This means that waste reduction is obtained for a smaller range
of wage distributions. The intuition here is that a larger status differential implies that the rich
have a larger optimal expenditure in signalling which, in turn, implies that they have a larger
optimal labor income; hence, a marginal labor income tax transfers more money from the rich to
the poor, making it more likely that the poor become rich enough to force the rich to spend more in
signalling in order to differentiate from them.
Less obviously, the impact of a greater H−L on σh is non-monotonic. More precisely, it is
negative for H−L <− ln(1−√β )(1+a) and positive for H−L >− ln(1−√β )(1+a).20 This
is because, besides the positive effect described for σx which is increasing in H−L, there is also a
constant negative effect: a greater H−L makes h-types work more and, hence, being taxed more.
For small values of H−L this latter effect dominates.
19 By inspection of (19), i.e., the counterpart of (11) under cardinal status, we see that Z does play a role beyond scale
effects.
20 The cutoff value can be obtained by differentiating σh with respect to H−L.
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Finally, the impact of a greater preference for leisure a is positive on σx and ambiguous on
σh. A greater a makes both l-types and h-types work less, and hence earn less. As a result a
marginal tax transfers less money from the rich to the poor, making it less likely that the poor
become rich enough to force the rich to spend more in signalling in order to differentiate from
them. This explains why σx increases. A further effect of smaller earnings is that, depending on
the relative change in incomes, the poor may find it relatively more or less attractive to engage in
social competition for status through conspicuous consumption. If the poor find it more attractive
then a marginal tax will make the rich save less on signalling since the poor are now more costly to
discourage. In this case, the direction of change in σh is ambiguous. If, instead, the poor find it
less attractive to engage in social competition, then σh increases.
5 Wasteful consumption under cardinal status
We now consider the case where status is cardinal, that is, both H and L depend on the equilibrium
incomes y∗l and y
∗
h, which in turn implies that H and L depend on τ . Let Lyl , Lyh ,Hyl and Hyh denote
the derivatives of L and H with respect to y∗l and y
∗
h.
21 Let us also assume, as it seems reasonable,
that Lyl ≥ 0, Lyh ≤ 0, Hyl ≤ 0 and Hyh ≥ 0 and that they are all bounded.22
Our main point here is that, under cardinal status, the introduction of a labor income tax has
an additional consequence which is otherwise absent under ordinal status: the prize of the social
competition – i.e., the value of status itself – may change. This in turn affects how the income tax
impacts on wasteful conspicuous consumption.
By differentiating (7) with respect to τ and by opportunely rearranging terms (again, we
conduct the analysis at τ = 0):(
1
wlZ
−ae L−H1+a Hyh−Lyh
(1+a)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cardinal status indirect effect
dx∗
dτ
=
(
1− e L−H1+a
) 1−β
(1+a)2
[
wh
wl
−σx
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ordinal status effect, <0 ⇔ whwl <σx
+
+Z[wlλ (Hyl−Lyl ,Hyh−Lyh)−whη(Hyl−Lyl ,Hyh−Lyh)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cardinal status direct effect,<0⇔ whwl >
λ
η
.
(19)
where λ and η are functions that summarize how changes in the status prize – brought about
by changes in incomes – directly affect the change in conspicuous consumption through wage
inequality. More precisely, λ and η measure the sensitivity to, respectively, wl and wh of that
part of the change in conspicuous consumption which is induced by a change in the status prize
H−L because of a change in yh and yl . The detailed specification of λ and η can be found in the
Appendix (see the proof of Result 4).
By inspecting (19) we see that, besides the effect already seen in the case of ordinal status –
represented by the first term of the right hand side, which we call ordinal status effect – there are
two additional effects which exist because of cardinal status. One is what we call cardinal status
direct effect and is represented by the second term of the right hand side of (19). It accounts for
21 We implicitly assume that s is such that L and H are differentiable.
22 See Definition 1 (concerns for status) and 3 (cardinal concerns) in Bilancini and Boncinelli (2014) for more details.
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the impact of τ on the status prize H−L through the effect on net incomes. Note that both sign
and magnitude of this direct effect depend on how relative wages compare to the ratio between
functions λ and η , which in turn depend on both Lyl−Hyl and Lyh−Hyh , i.e., on how the status
prize is affected by a change in yl and yh. The following result summarizes how the cardinal direct
effect behaves.
RESULT 4. The cardinal status direct effect at τ = 0 is decreasing in wh and increasing in wl ,
becoming negative if and only if wh/wl > λ/η . Moreover, we have that:
• if
d2T
dτdwl
<
d2T
dτdwh
then λ/η is increasing in
Hyh−Lyh
|Hyl−Lyl |
;
• if
d2T
dτdwl
=
d2T
dτdwh
then λ/η is constant;
• if
d2T
dτdwl
>
d2T
dτdwh
then λ/η is decreasing in
Hyh−Lyh
|Hyl−Lyl |
.
Already from equation (19) one can see that wage inequality negatively affects waste through
the cardinal status direct effect. This is in sharp contrast with the positive impact of wage inequality
through the ordinal status effect. Indeed, under ordinal status a greater inequality increases the
status prize and, hence, increases wasteful consumption which in turn makes the income tax more
effective.
Moreover, from Result 4 we understand under what circumstances the critical threshold λ/η
depends positively or negatively on the relative sensitivity of the status prize H−L to incomes.
It turns out that what the crucial issue is whether the marginal transfer dT/dτ is more sensitive
to wh or wh: if the marginal transfer grows more (less) in wh than in wl , then concerns for social
status that give a relative greater importance to getting a high income have the effect of increasing
(decreasing) the degree of wage inequality required for the direct cardinal effect to be negative.
Intuitively, if the marginal transfer grows more in wh than in wl , then the net effect of a greater
wage inequality is to increase the marginal transfer, with the result that total wasteful consumption
by h-types is more likely to increase.
More can be said on the sign of the cardinal direct effect if we impose an extra bit of structure
on how the status prize H−L reacts to changes in incomes:
RESULT 5. If
(
d2T
dτdwl
− d
2T
dτdwh
)
[(Hyh−Lyh)+(Hyl−Lyl )] ≤ 0 then the cardinal status direct
effect is negative.
From Result 5 we see that, to obtain a negative cardinal direct effect, it is enough to have that
the marginal transfer is not increasing in wage inequality when the status prize is more sensitive
to high incomes or, equivalently, to have that the marginal transfer is not decreasing in wage
inequality when the status prize is more sensitive to low incomes. The intuition for this result goes
along the same lines described for Result 4, with the addition that the stated condition ensures
that λ/η ≤ 1. Also, Result 5 implies that if income affects the status prize symmetrically, i.e.,
Hyl−Lyl = |Hyh−Lyh |, then the cardinal status direct effect at τ = 0 is always negative. This leads
to the following conclusion: if status concerns are such that the social pain felt by an l-type for an
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increase in y∗h is the same as the one felt for a decrease in y
∗
l , then a marginal tax reduces waste via
the cardinal direct effect.
The second cardinal effect is represented by the coefficient of dx∗/dτ appearing on the left
hand side of (19), and we call it cardinal status indirect effect. It is indirect in the sense that it
accounts for the change in H−L generated by the variation of y∗h which, in turn, is generated by
the change in x∗ in the first place. The intuition is the following. Because of the increase in τ , the
amount of conspicuous consumption which makes l-types indifferent between being considered
rich and being considered poor also changes. This in turn affects the choice of h-types about how
much to work and, hence, their income. As a result the status prize H−L also changes and this
feedbacks on the amount of conspicuous consumption x∗ which makes l-types indifferent between
being considered rich and being considered poor. Note that neither the change in x∗ nor the change
in y∗h does alter the equilibrium choice of l-types, as in equilibrium their conspicuous consumption
is nil. This explains why the coefficient representing the cardinal indirect effect contains the term
Lyh−Hyh but not the term Lyl−Hyl .
Since the cardinal indirect effect is never greater than unity – recall that Lyh−Hyh ≤ 0 – one
could suggest to interpret it as the reciprocal of a sort of waste multiplier. However, and this is
somewhat surprising, the cardinal indirect effect can take both positive and negative values, and
in particular it can be lower than −1.23 If the effect is positive, then it acts indeed as a proper
multiplier: it magnifies the impact of an increase in τ . Therefore, when the sum of the ordinal
effect and the direct cardinal effect is negative (positive), then the indirect cardinal effect multiplies
waste reduction (increase). If, instead, the cardinal indirect effect is negative, then it may either
magnify or lessen the change in x∗ and, in addition, it reverts its direction of change. The reason
behind this perhaps counterintuitive outcome is that a first change in x∗ triggers further changes
in x∗ that go in the opposite direction and that more than offset the first one. For instance, we
might have that an increase in τ has the direct effect of making the status prize less attractive and
conspicuous consumption more costly but, because it makes the incomes of l-types and h-types
more similar, it requires a greater conspicuous consumption for l-types to be indifferent between
being considered rich and being considered poor; this, in turn, forces h-types to work more and
hence increases both their income and the status prize of being considered rich; if the cardinal
status effect is negative it means that this latter effect dominates leading to an overall increase in x∗.
We stress that the result crucially depends on the interaction of two characteristics of our signalling
model, namely the cardinality of status and the endogeneity of the status-bearing asset.24,25
23 We abstract from the case where (1+a)2 =−e L−H1+a (Lyh−Hyh)awlZ and therefore dx∗/dτ cannot be determined (the
hypotheses of the Implicit Function Theorem are not met). Intuitively, a small variation of x∗ is not sufficient to
re-establish equilibrium conditions since it induces behaviors which in turn require a further and almost identical
variation of x∗.
24 In Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012) we do not observe such an effect because the status-bearing asset is exogenous.
25 In the case of a negative cardinal status indirect effect, the feedback process might diverge. However, given that both
labor supply and conspicuous consumption are bounded quantities and that both leisure and consumption are essential,
divergence must be considered as unlikely unless also utility from status diverges, which can be regarded as a rather
exceptional case.
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wl
wh
dx∗
dτ > 0
dx∗
dτ < 0
dx∗
dτ > 0
cardinal indirect effect > 0 cardinal indirect effect < 0
wh
wl
=σx
wh
wl
= λη
Figure 2: A case where the cardinal status direct effect is negative for every wh/wl , as implied by Result 5. The ordinal
status effect is positive and when wh/wl > σx, and for sufficiently high values of wh/wl more than offsets the cardinal
status direct effect (the shaded area on the left). The sign of dx∗/dτ is obtained taking also into account the sign of
cardinal status indirect effect.
www.economics-ejournal.org 15
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–32)
wl
wh
dx∗
dτ > 0
dx∗
dτ < 0
dx∗
dτ > 0
dx∗
dτ < 0
dx∗
dτ > 0
cardinal indirect effect > 0 cardinal indirect effect < 0
wh
wl
=σx whwl =
λ
η
Figure 3: A case where the cardinal status direct effect is negative only for wh/wl > λ/η , as implied by Result 4. The
ordinal status effect is positive and when wh/wl > σx > λ/η , so when σx > wh/wl > λ/η the sum of the cardinal
status direct effect and the ordinal status effect is negative. For a sufficiently high value of wh/wl the positive ordinal
status effect dominates (the shaded area on the left). For sufficiently low values of wh/wl the positive cardinal status
direct effect dominates, although this can happen only if wl is not too small (the shaded area on the right). The sign of
dx∗/dτ is obtained taking also into account the sign of cardinal status indirect effect.
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wl
wh
dx∗
dτ > 0
dx∗
dτ < 0
dx∗
dτ > 0
dx∗
dτ < 0
cardinal indirect effect > 0 cardinal indirect effect < 0
wh
wl
= λη
wh
wl
=σx
Figure 4: A case where the cardinal status direct effect is negative only for wh/wl > λ/η > σx, as implied by Result 4.
The ordinal status effect is positive for wh/wl > σx, so when λ/η > wh/wl > σx the sum of the cardinal status direct
effect and the ordinal status effect is positive. For a sufficiently high value of wh/wl the positive ordinal status effect
dominates, while for a sufficiently low value of wh/wl the positive cardinal status direct effect dominates. In either case
the sum of the ordinal status effect and the cardinal status direct effect is positive (the shaded area). The sign of dx∗/dτ
is obtained taking also into account the sign of cardinal status indirect effect.
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In conclusion, under cardinal status we have two additional effects of τ on x∗ that can drastically
change – with respect to the case of ordinal status – the range of wh/wl for which waste decreases.
The following proposition summarizes the possible cases:
PROPOSITION 3.
i) In case λ/η ≤ 1, if the cardinal status indirect effect is positive (resp., negative), then the
introduction of a marginal income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed leads to a waste
increase/decrease for wh/wl sufficiently high and to a waste decrease/increase otherwise.
ii) In case σx > λ/η > 1, if the cardinal status indirect effect is positive/negative, then the
introduction of a marginal income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed leads to a waste
increase/decrease for wh/wl sufficiently high, to a waste decrease/increase for wh/wl in
an intermediate range, and either to a waste decrease or to a waste increase for wh/wl
sufficiently low.
iii) In case λ/η > σx > 1, if the cardinal status indirect effect is positive/negative, then the
introduction of a marginal income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed leads to a waste
increase/decrease for wh/wl sufficiently high, either to a waste decrease or to a waste
increase for wh/wl in an intermediate range, and to a waste increase/decrease.
To better illustrate cases i)-iii) described in Proposition 3, we provide a graphical representation
for each of them. An example of case i) is represented in Figure 2, an example of case ii) is
represented in Figure 3, while an example of case iii) is represented in Figure 4. Cases i)-iii) give
rise to different relationships between wage inequality and change in waste, but in all cases such a
relationship turns out to be non-monotonic. This can be seen in Figures 2, 3, and 4 by looking at
the sign of dx∗/dτ along a counterclockwise path – i.e., a path of increasing wage inequality – that
begins from a point where wh/wl is almost 1 and the cardinal status indirect effect is negative.
Furthermore, in the light of Result 4, we can conclude that both the relative sensitivity of the
status prize to incomes and the sensitivity of the marginal transfer to wages play a crucial role
to establish which of cases i)-iii) actually arises. In particular, if the marginal transfer is more
(less) sensitive to wh than to wl , then a greater (smaller) relative sensitivity of the status prize to the
income of h-types increases the likelihood of case iii) with respect to case ii) and the likelihood of
case ii) with respect to case i). Note that, in the light of Result 5, we see that when incomes affect
the status prizes symmetrically only case i) is feasible. Therefore, to the extent that one considers
the typical situation to be characterized by such a symmetry, Result 5 and Proposition 3 together
imply that case i) is the typical situation.
Proposition 3 also tells us that the sign of the cardinal status indirect effect crucially affects
the direction of change in waste. In the general case we cannot say much about the sign of the
cardinal status indirect effect, if not that both a greater wage for l-types and a greater sensitivity of
the status prize to the income of h-types tend to turn the effect negative. In one case of interest,
however, we can pin down more precise conditions that characterize a negative cardinal status
indirect effect. This case is when the status prize H−L only depends on the income gap y∗h− y∗l ,
a specification of status concerns that is quite common in the economic literature on status (e.g.
Clark and Oswald, 1998; Cooper et al., 2001; Goerke and Hillesheim, 2013). Note that, under such
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a specification, the status prize is affected symmetrically by changes in yh and yl , implying that we
are in case i) of Proposition 3. Moreover, the following proposition holds:
PROPOSITION 4. Let both L and H depend on the income gap (yh−yl) only. Then, the introduction
of a marginal income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed leads to a negative cardinal status
indirect effect if and only if it increases the income gap. Moreover, in such a case the waste
necessarily increases.
Proposition 4 clarifies one important implication of cardinal status when the status prize depends
on income differences only. A marginal tax on labor income can increase the equilibrium income
gap only if waste increases. In other words, a greater waste is a prerequisite for a greater tax rate to
increase post-tax income inequality. Hence, in order for the income tax to be socially efficient it
must not increase post-tax inequality as measured by the income gap.
Before turning our attention to individuals’ utility, one further difference with the case of
ordinal status is worth mentioning. Under cardinal status dT/dτ is not granted anymore to be
decreasing in τ . Actually, we have the following result:
RESULT 6. If dT/dτ < wlZ at τ = 0 and d(H−L)/dτ ≤ 0, then dT/dτ < wlZ for all τ ∈ [0,1].
In words, if the impact of a greater τ on H−L is positive, then people are induced to work more
and, hence, the marginal transfer increases in τ . Nevertheless, we continue to focus on the case of
τ = 0. The reason is that, besides providing a better analytical tractability, at τ = 0 we can have a
more neat comparison with the results obtained under ordinal status.26 However, from Result 6,
and more in general from the fact that cardinal effects may be large and of either sign, we see that
assuming τ = 0 no longer entails a conservative perspective on waste reduction.
Finally, we turn to the effects of the introduction of a marginal income tax on individuals’
utility. To assess this issue we have to consider both the effects on utility due to the change in
waste and the effects on utility due to the change in H and L. Combining such effects gives rise
to a large variety of cases. Instead of providing a case-based analysis, we prefer to focus on the
possibility of obtaining a Pareto improvement, emphasizing the differences with the case of ordinal
status. Differentiating utility functions at equilibrium with respect to τ we get the counterparts of
(15) and (16) under cardinal status:
dUl
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=0
=
(1+a)
wlZ
dT
dτ
−1+ dL
dτ
, (20)
dUh
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=0
= −1+
e
L−H
1+a
(
(1+a)
dT
dτ
−wlZ d(H−L)dτ
)
whZ−
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
wlZ
+
dH
dτ
. (21)
By manipulating (20) and (21) we get that utility increases when, respectively:
wh
wl
−
[
1−a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ordinal status effect, >0
+
(
Lyl
dy∗l
dτ
+Lyh
dy∗h
dτ
)
1
(1−β )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cardinal status effect ofL
> 0 , (22)
26 Note that in τ = 0 the marginal transfer dT/dτ is the same as under ordinal status (see the proof of Result 6).
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[(
(1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
+β
)
e
L−H
1+a +
(
1− e L−H1+a
)]
− wh
wl
(
1− e L−H1+a (1−β )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ordinal status effect, >0 ⇔ whwl <σh
+
+
(
Lyl
dy∗l
dτ
+Lyh
dy∗h
dτ
)
e
L−H
1+a︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cardinal status effect ofL
+
(
Hyl
dy∗l
dτ
+Hyh
dy∗h
dτ
)(
wh
wl
−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cardinal status effect ofH
> 0 . (23)
From (22) we see that the impact of τ on y∗l and y
∗
h, and hence on L, can increase or decrease the
threshold value of wh/wl for which l-types are made better off. In particular, differently from what
seen for ordinal status, under cardinal status the introduction of a labor income tax may make
l-types worse off: if L decreases enough to offset the positive ordinal status effect, then l-types’
utility decreases. Notably, this may happen even if the equilibrium income of l-types increases.
Indeed, a higher tax rate may increase the expenditure in signalling by h-types, and because of this
it may induce h-types to work more and hence obtain a higher income, which in turn can reduce
l-types’ social status to an extent that more than offsets the benefits of their higher income.
From (23) we see that also the threshold value of wh/wl for which h-types are made better off
depends on how τ affects the equilibrium incomes and the status prize. However, in this case both
the change in H and the change in L matter, and the reason is that H−L affects the equilibrium
amount of conspicuous consumption x∗. In particular, we see that the new threshold is given by the
sum of σh – which is got by imposing that the first term in (23) is greater than zero – and the net
cardinal effects of L and H. The cardinal effect of L has the same sign of Lyl (dy
∗
l /dτ)+Lyh(dy
∗
h/dτ)
meaning that a rise in the status prize of being considered poor positively affects the utility of
h-types. The reason is that a greater L makes l-types less inclined to compete for being considered
rich and, therefore, it allows h-types to spend less on conspicuous consumption. On the contrary, a
change in H has two effects which counteract each other. On the one side, an increase of H raises
the equilibrium utility of h-types directly. On the other side, however, it increases the social prize
of being considered rich and therefore, in equilibrium, it makes h-types spend more on wasteful
conspicuous consumption in order to discourage l-types from emulation. As (23) reveals, the
former effect always prevails, and the cardinal effect of H comes out to be of the same sign of
Hyl (dy
∗
l /dτ)+Hyh(dy
∗
h/dτ).
Together inequalities (22) and (23) give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the intro-
duction of a marginal income tax to generate a Pareto improvement. The following proposition
reports an important implication of such conditions.
PROPOSITION 5. For any value of wh/wl > 1, there exist differentiable functions H(yh,yl) and
L(yh,yl), with Lyl ≥ 0, Lyh ≤ 0, Hyl ≤ 0 and Hyh ≥ 0, such that the introduction of a marginal labor
income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed induces both a reduction in waste and a strict
Pareto improvement.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the Appendix. Here we just provide the intuition of the
result. Fix wh/wl . If the ordinal effect is already pushing towards a waste reduction and a Pareto
improvement then it suffices to have the cardinal effect weak enough not to offset the ordinal
effects. If, instead, the ordinal effect pushes towards a waste increase and lower utility for h-types,
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then we can think of a cardinal definition of status such that the status of being considered rich,
H, is not very much sensitive to the income of l-types and h-types while the status of being
considered poor, L, is sensitive enough to induce a large change in L but not so much to change
the sign of the cardinal status indirect effect. Under such a definition of status we have that taxing
labor income and evenly redistributing the tax revenue makes l-types better off: l-types consume
more inconspicuous goods, their status increases – as L increases – and they enjoy more leisure.
Moreover, l-types find it less profitable to engage in social competition because the status prize,
H−L, is now smaller. This decreases the amount of conspicuous consumption that h-types must
use to separate themselves from l-types. Therefore, h-types can be made better off: h-types lose
at most a little in terms of their status – because H does not change much – while they certainly
increase both their inconspicuous consumption and their leisure due to the reduced competition
for status – i.e., x∗ decreases. This case is by no means exceptional. For instance, definitions
of social status based on relative deprivation and upward-looking comparisons do have similar
characteristics.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the impact of labor income taxes when agents can signal their
relative standing by spending on a conspicuous good. We have assumed that the tax revenue is
redistributed by means of lump sum transfers and that status depends on the distribution of net
incomes. Our main result is the characterization of how the desirability of a labor income tax
depends on the definition of social status.
We contributed in two ways to the literature on income taxation under status concerns. In
the first place, our results suggests that under ordinal status the introduction of a labor income
tax is desirable only if the distribution of pre-tax wages is not too unequal. This confirms the
results obtained in a different setup by Ireland (1998) and Corneo (2002). In addition, we have
characterized two relevant thresholds of inequality in pre-tax wage. If inequality is below the
lowest threshold – i.e, pre-tax wages are quite close – then the introduction of a linear labor income
tax reduces waste in conspicuous consumption and makes everybody better off. If inequality is
between the two thresholds – i.e., pre-tax wages are neither too close or too distant – then the
tax reduces waste, makes low income individuals better off but high income individual worse off.
Finally, if inequality is above highest threshold – i.e., pre-tax wages are quite distant – then the
tax increases waste, making again low income individuals better off and high income individual
worse off. So we understand that, when status is ordinal, the inequality of pre-tax wages and the
taxation of labor income are substitutes with respect to the objective of mitigating losses due to
status-seeking behavior.
In the second place, we have analyzed the effects of taxing and redistributing labor income
under cardinal status, providing a number of novel findings which show that the results obtained
for ordinal status need not hold for cardinal status. First, under cardinal status it is neither true
that lowly productive individuals are always made better off by the introduction of a labor income
tax, nor that a greater inequality in pre-tax wage rates necessarily makes waste reduction less
likely. In particular, under cardinal status a labor income tax could be Pareto improving even
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if pre-tax wage rates are extremely unequal, while it could increase waste even when pre-tax
wage rates are very similar. Indeed, we found that under cardinal status the relationship between
the inequality of pre-tax wages and the impact of the tax on waste is non-monotonic, following
non-trivial patterns. So, we have opted to describe how such a relationship is linked to the relative
importance of the cardinal characteristics of social status. Furthermore, under cardinal status
a self-reinforcing mechanism can arise: more conspicuous consumption leads to work more in
order to earna greater income, which in turn increases the status prize and, hence, asks for more
conspicuous consumption. The reason for this is that the value social status becomes endogenous
under cardinal status, since the status prize depends on labor incomes. Thus, the introduction of a
labor income tax might move the economy towards vicious equilibria sustained by the fact that
a high conspicuous consumption requires a high income that in turn makes the status of being
considered rich highly valuable (with respect to the status of being considered poor) and, hence, it
makes conspicuous consumption worth its spending. Overall, these findings suggest that, under
cardinal status, labor income taxes and wage inequality need not be substitutes – actually, they
might well be complements – in mitigating the inefficiencies of status-seeking behavior.
Our findings are relevant, we believe, for at least two reasons. The first is that they provide
an argument in favor of the claim that, in models with status concerns, the applied definition
of status need to be well founded, as much depends on it (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2008). In
this regard, our findings not only suggest that inequality does not need to be a substitute for
redistribution (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2012), but they also indicate that if status is cardinal then
its value can become endogenous and can give rise to effects on both incomes and waste that are
unforeseeable if one sticks to a model with ordinal status. This seems particularly relevant in the
light of Bilancini and Boncinelli (2014), who show that the presence of information asymmetries
in matching markets are conducive to concerns for cardinal status (see also the models in Hopkins,
2012; Bhaskar and Hopkins, 2016), and of Bilancini and Boncinelli (2019), who show that cardinal
status naturally arises when rewards of today’s competition for status represent endowments
of tomorrow’s competition for status (see Hopkins, 2008; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2010, for a
discussion on the role of endowments and rewards).
The second reason is more specific to the issue of the optimal tax policy. In the light of our
results on cardinal status, we can conclude that the degree of pre-tax wage inequality does not imply
much per se about the desirability of a labor income tax. In particular, under some specifications of
cardinal status a greater wage inequality may ask for a greater taxation and redistribution whereas
under some other specifications it may ask for exactly the opposite. However, we are not in a
situation where “everything goes”. As indicated by our Propositions 3 and 4, to know what is
better we need to know the actual shape of status concerns. In our opinion, this asks for conducting
an adequate research on the way social status is computed and evaluated by people.
The analysis in this paper rests on some simplifying assumptions, and leaves a few issues
in need of further investigation. In particular, having two types of workers only, low-skilled
and high-skilled, may limit the applicability of the model. Future research may be dedicated to
extending the theoretical model to include a continuum of types, and hence of income levels, which
would lend the model to be used in empirical estimations. It would also be important to assess
how likely efficiency gains are (both in terms of welfare and wasteful consumption reduction),
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possibly by relying on numerical simulations. Further theoretical investigation may focus on the
distinction between durable and non-durable consumption goods, with the former being particularly
relevant when status concerns are based on wealth. Finally, a potentially fruitful direction for
future research may involve the unpackaging of cardinal status by following current sociological
research: accounting for precise sociological forces at play (e.g., following the taxonomy provided
by Jasso et al., 2016), one may hope to obtain sharper predictions.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Result 1
The result is immediately got from (11) by noticing that e
L−H
1+a < 1 for L < H.
A.2 Proof of Result 2
We take the first derivative of T with respect to τ and we obtain that
dT
dτ
=
ZK [(1−2τ)E− τ(1− τ)E ′]
E2
, (24)
where
K ≡
(
(1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
+β
)
wl +(1−β )wh , (25)
E ≡ (1+a)(1− τ)+ τa
(
β +(1−β )e L−H1+a
)
, (26)
E ′ ≡ dE
dτ
. (27)
We take the second derivative of T with respect to τ and we obtain that
d2T
dτ2
=
2ZK
E3
(E ′τ−E)(E +E ′−E ′τ) . (28)
Note that (28) is non-positive if a
(
β (1−β )e L−H1+a
)
≥ 0, which is always satisfied.
A.3 Proof of Result 3
The equilibrium income of l-types is
y∗l = wl(Z− z∗l )(1− τ)+T =
Zwl(1− τ)+T
1+a
. (29)
Taking the derivative with respect to τ we get that dy∗l /dτ > 0 if and only if dT/dτ > Zwl .
Moreover, the equilibrium income of h-types is
y∗h =wh(Z−z∗h)(1−τ)+T =
Zwh(1− τ)
1+a
− a
1+a
[
Te
L−H
1+a −
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
(1− τ)Zwl
]
+T . (30)
Taking the derivative with respect to τ we get that dy∗h/dτ > 0 if and only if
whZ− dTdτ <
(
dT
dτ
−wlZ
)
a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
. (31)
We note that for τ = 0 the above inequality does not hold. Furthermore, since d2T/dτ2 < 0 (as
shown in proof of Result 2), we conclude that inequality (31) never holds for τ ∈ [0,1].
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A.4 Proof of Result 4
Functions λ and η are defined as follows:
λ (Hyl −Lyl ,Hyh−Lyh) =
e
L−H
1+a
(1+a)3
(Hyl −Lyl )
[
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β − (1+a)
]
+
+
e
L−H
1+a
(1+a)3
(Hyh−Lyh)
[
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β
]
> 0 , (32)
η(Hyl −Lyl ,Hyh−Lyh) =
e
L−H
1+a
(1+a)3
(Hyl −Lyl ) [(1−β )− (1+a)]+
+
e
L−H
1+a
(1+a)3
(Hyh−Lyh)(1−β )> 0 . (33)
From (32) and (33) we have that λ/η is equal to:
(Hyl−Lyl )
[
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β − (1+a)
]
+(Hyh−Lyh)
[
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β
]
(Hyl−Lyl )[(1−β )− (1+a)]+(Hyh−Lyh)(1−β )
. (34)
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of (34) by |Hyl−Lyl | we get:
−
[
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β − (1+a)
]
+
Hyh−Lyh
|Hyl−Lyl |
[
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β
]
− [(1−β )− (1+a)]+ Hyh−Lyh|Hyl−Lyl |
(1−β )
. (35)
First, note that in τ = 0 we have:
d2T
dτdwl
=
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β
1+a
,
d2T
dτdwh
=
(1−β )
1+a
.
so that dT/dτdwl is greater, equal, or smaller than dT/dτdwh if and only if (1−β )a(1−e L−H1+a )+β
is greater, equal, or smaller than (1−β ).
Second, taking the derivative of (35) with respect to (Hyh−Lyh)/(|Hyl−Lyl |) we see that it is
positive if and only if (1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )+β > 1−β .
Finally, for the case (1− β )a(1− e L−H1+a ) + β = (1− β ) we have that the first term of the
numerator and the first term of the denominator of (35) are identical, so that λ/η is constant in
(Hyh−Lyh)/(|Hyl−Lyl |).
A.5 Proof of Result 5
From (19) we have that the cardinal status direct effect is negative if and only if wlλ < whη . Since
wl < wh, a sufficient condition for a negative cardinal status direct effects is that:
λ (Hyl−Lyl ,Hyh−Lyh)≤ η(Hyl−Lyl ,Hyh−Lyh)⇔
⇔ (Hyl−Lyl )
[(
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )−1
)
+β
]
≤−(Hyh−Lyh)
[(
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )−1
)
+β
]
⇔
⇔ [(Hyl−Lyl )+(Hyh−Lyh)]
[(
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )−1
)
+β
]
≤ 0 . (36)
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Finally, note that:
d2T
dτdwl
− d
2T
dτdwh
=
(
(1−β )a(1− e L−H1+a )−1
)
+β . (37)
A.6 Proof of Result 6
We take the first derivative of T with respect to τ in the case of cardinal status, and we obtain that
dT
dτ
=
ZK [(1−2τ)E− τ(1− τ)E ′)
E2
+
+
d(H−L)
dτ
a
1+a
τ(1−β )yle L−H1+a . (38)
From the proof of Result 2 we know that the first term of the right hand side is decreasing
in τ . Moreover, the second term of the right hand side is equal to 0 at τ = 0. Therefore, if
d(H−L)/dτ ≤ 0 and dT/dτ < wlZ at τ = 0, then dT/dτ < wlZ for all τ ∈ [0,1].
A.7 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a Riley equilibrium. Since types separate, xl 6= xh. We now prove that this implies that
y∗h > y
∗
l . If y
∗
h = y
∗
l , then there would be no interest in signalling, and xl = 0 = xh, against the
hypothesis of xl 6= xh. Suppose then that y∗l > y∗h. In equilibrium l-type individuals must find it not
profitable to deviate from xl to xh, therefore
ln
(
wl(1− τ)Z
1+a
− a
1+a
(T − x∗l )− x∗l +T
)
+a ln
(
a
1+a
(
T − x∗l
wl(1− τ) +Z
))
+L≥
≥ ln
(
wl(1− τ)Z
1+a
− a
1+a
(T − x∗h)− x∗h+T
)
+a ln
(
a
1+a
(
T − x∗h
wl(1− τ) +Z
))
+H . (39)
We will now prove that h-type individuals must strictly prefer choosing x∗l than x
∗
h, and so in Riley
equilibrium it cannot be that y∗l > y
∗
h. First note that if x
∗
l < x
∗
h then it is immediate to conclude
that h-type individuals strictly prefer x∗l to x
∗
h. Hence, suppose x
∗
l > x
∗
h. We take the derivative with
respect of wl – evaluated at a generic w – of both the left hand side and right hand side of the above
inequality, and we easily establish the following inequality:
(1− τ)Z
w(1− τ)Z+T −axl −
a
w+Zw(1− τ) >
(1− τ)Z
w(1− τ)Z+T −axh −
a
w+Zw(1− τ) ,
which implies, together with (39), that h-type individuals strictly gain passing from x∗h to x
∗
l .
Therefore, it must be that y∗h > y
∗
l . We also observe that y
∗
h− y∗l is bounded away from zero for all
values of x∗l and x
∗
h such that x
∗
h ≥ x∗l .
We now show that a Riley equilibrium exists. Consider a profile of strategies that is parameter-
ized with respect to xh, i.e., to the signal of h-type individuals. In particular, we set xl = 0, i.e., the
low types spend nothing on signalling, and we let xh > 0 free to vary, but with types that separate
from each other; suppose also that zl and zh are equal to their utility maximizing levels given xl = 0
and xh. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote these levels as z∗l (0,xh) and z
∗
h(0,xh), where
the functional form is obtained from equation (4). Pick out-of-equilibrium beliefs such that those
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individuals who deviate from the level of x prescribed by the profile are believed, with probability
1, to earn an income equal to x – which is the minimum income that allows to buy x – and, hence,
get the associated status. We now argue that we can always find x∗h such that the profile made of
(z∗l (0,x
∗
h),0) and (z
∗
h(0,x
∗
h),x
∗
h) represents the Riley equilibrium.
Given the selected beliefs, and thanks to the assumption that these beliefs are always able to
discourage out-of-equilibrium increases of the signal, we can focus our attention to check that
l-types do not find it profitable to imitate the h-types, and vice versa.
Let us start from l-types. We observe that, for xh that is low enough, l-types finds it profitable
to buy the same amount of signal of the rich. At the same time, by the fact that the utility from
status is bounded we can conclude the l-types finds it unprofitable to imitate the rich when xh is
large enough. Finally, by exploiting the continuity of the functions involved we can affirm that
there exists a minimum level of signal, that we call x∗h, which makes l-types indifferent between
imitating the rich or not. In particular, at that level we have that expression (39) is satisfied as
equality.
We now consider h-types. Since wh > wl , it is easy to check that h-types strictly prefer to spend
x∗h on signalling and be recognized as rich, than save on signalling and be recognized as poor.
We observe that, by construction, the profile that we have just shown to be an equilibrium is
the one where expenditure in signaling is minimized and, therefore, it is the Riley equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to the conditions that must hold in the Riley equilibrium. Condition
(6) holds by construction. For the other equilibrium conditions, recall that l-types must necessarily
be indifferent between imitating h-types and not imitating them, implying that the following must
hold:
ln
(
wl(1− τ)Z+T
1+a
)
+a ln
(
a
1+a
(
T
wl(1− τ) +Z
))
+L =
= ln
(
wl(1− τ)Z+T − x∗h
1+a
)
+a ln
(
a
1+a
(
T − x∗h
wl(1− τ) +Z
))
+H .
(40)
Thanks to the log-specification, from (40) we can easily derive (7). Inserting (6) and (7) in (4) and
exploiting equilibrium conditions, we obtain (8) and (9). Finally, we substitute (8) and (9) into the
definition of balanced budget transfer T , and we obtain (10).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove that σx > σh, and then the proposition follows from the inequalities (18), (17) and (14)
established in the text. By using (18) and (14), the inequality σx > σh can be written, after some
simplifications, as(
1
1−β −
(
1− e L−H1+a
))
>
e
L−H
1+a (1−β )
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
1− e L−H1+a (1−β )
,
which gives
β
(1−β )
[
1− (1−β )e L−H1+a
] > 0 .
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the sum of the ordinal status effect and the cardinal status direct effect:
Σ(wl,wh) =
(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
(
wh
wl
−σx
)
+Z(wlλ −whη) .
The sign of Σ(wl,wh) concords with the sign of the following second degree polynomial in wl and
wh:
Zλw2l −
[(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
σx+Zηwh
]
wl +
(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
wh . (41)
Equating expression (41) to zero we obtain a second degree equation in wl whose solutions are
functions of wh (and other parameters). Solving for wl we obtain the following solutions:
w−l (wh) =
(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
σx+Zηwh−
√
∆
2Zλ
, (42)
w+l (wh) =
(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
σx+Zηwh+
√
∆
2Zλ
, (43)
∆ = Z2η2w2h+2 [σxη−2λ ]
(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
Zwh+
[(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
(1+a)2
]2
σ2x .
Whenever we have ∆ > 0, three cases are possible: (a) Σ(wl,wh) > 0 for wl < w−l (wh), (b)
Σ(wl,wh)≤ 0 for w−l (wh)≤ wl ≤ w+l (wh), and (c) Σ(wl,wh)> 0 for wl > w+l (wh). Note that, if
w−l (wh) exists, then w
−
l (wh)> 0, implying that case (a) is feasible. However, since wl < wh, the
feasibility of wl > w−l (wh) is not warranted, so that case (b) and case (c) are not always feasible.
Whenever we have ∆≤ 0, the only possible case is Σ(wl,wh)> 0. Direct calculation shows
that the minimum value of ∆ as function of wh is attained for:
w˜h = 2
(
2
λ
η
−σx
)(
1− e L−H1+a
) (1−β )
Zη(1+a)2
Evaluating ∆ at w˜h we see, after some algebra, that it is positive if and only if σx > λ/η , which
therefore is a sufficient condition for both ∆> 0 and the existence of at least case (a).
We are now ready to prove claims i), ii), and iii), in turn.
Let λ/η ≤ 1. Since σx > 1, we have that λ/η < σx which implies that ∆> 0 and therefore at
least case (a) exists. Moreover, by Result 4, the cardinal status direct effect is negative for every
wh/wl . Since the ordinal status effect is negative for wl > σxwh, we also have that Σ(wl,wh)< 0
for wl > σxwh, implying that case (b) exists. By the same token, case (c) must be impossible.
Let σx > λ/η > 1. The first inequality implies that ∆ > 0 and therefore at least case (a)
exists. Moreover, from Result 4 follows that the cardinal status direct effect is negative for every
wl < whη/λ . Since the ordinal status effect is negative for wl > wh/σx, we have that Σ(wl,wh)< 0
for wh/σx < wl < whη/λ , implying that case (b) exists. Case (c) might be feasible or not, so that
for wl > wh/σx we can have Σ(wl,wh) of either sign.
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Let λ/η > σx > 1. The first inequality implies that we can have ∆≤ 0. If this is the case then
Σ(wl,wh)> 0. If, instead, ∆> 0 then at least case (a) exists. Again from Result 4, we know that the
cardinal status direct effect is positive for wl > whη/λ . Since the ordinal status effect is positive
for wl < wh/σx, we have that Σ(wl,wh)> 0 for whη/λ < wl < σxwh, which can fall in case (a) or
case (c). For the range whη/λ < wl < σxwh to fall in case (a) it must hold that wh/σx > w−l (wh).
Direct calculation shows that wh/σx > w−l (wh) if and only if λ/η < σx, implying that the range
whη/λ < wl < σxwh falls in case (c), so that also case (b) is feasible, meaning that we have
Σ(wl,wh)< 0 for intermediate values of wh/wl .
Finally, note that for any given value of wl , Z, H−L, and a, we can have the cardinal status
indirect effect either positive or negative, depending on the value of Hyh−Lyl .
A.10 Proof of Proposition 4
We want to show that:
Hyh−Lyh >
(1+a)2
awlZe
L−H
1+a
⇔ d(yh− yl)
dτ
> 0 ⇒ dx
∗
dτ
> 0 (44)
From (29) and (30) we get
y∗h− y∗l =
Z(wh−wl)(1− τ)
1+a
+
a
1+a
[
T
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
+
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
(1− τ)Zwl
]
. (45)
Differentiating (45) with respect to τ at τ = 0 we get
d
(
y∗h− y∗l
)
dτ
=−Z(wh−wl)
1+a
+
a
1+a
dT
dτ
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
−
1− e L−H1+a + d
(
e
L−H
1+a
)
dτ
Zwl
 . (46)
Since both L and H depend on (yh−yl) we get that Lyh =−Lyl and Hyh =−Hyl . This implies that
d
(
e
L−H
1+a
)
dτ
=
e
L−H
1+a
(1+a)
(Lyh−Hyh)
d(yh− yl)
dyl
. (47)
Plugging (47) in (46) and assuming that the indirect cardinal effect is different from zero, we can
solve for d(yh− yl)/dτ as follows:
d
(
y∗h− y∗l
)
dτ
=
(1+a)
[
Z(wl−wh)+a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)(dT
dτ
−Zwl
)]
(1+a)2+Zawl(Lyh−Hyh)e
L−H
1+a
. (48)
Considering the value of dT/dτ at τ = 0 (see proof of Result 2) it can be shown that the numerator
of (48) is negative if and only if
wh
a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
(1−β )
1+a
−1
+
+wl
1−a(1− e L−H1+a )+a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)(
(1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
+β
)
1+a
< 0 . (49)
www.economics-ejournal.org 33
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 13 (2019–32)
The coefficient of wh is negative while the coefficient of wl might be either negative or positive. It
follows that if (49) holds for wh = wl then it holds for any wh > wl . Imposing wh = wl we get that
inequality (49) holds if and only if (1−β )
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
< 1 which is always the case. Therefore,
the numerator of (48) is negative. From this follows the equivalence result in (44).
The remaining part of the Proposition can be proved by noting that
y∗h− y∗l =
Zwh(1− τ)+T +ax∗
1+a
− Zwl(1− τ)+T
1+a
, (50)
from which, differentiating with respect to τ at τ = 0, we get
d
(
y∗h− y∗l
)
dτ
=
Z(wl−wh)
1+a
+
a
1+a
dx∗
dτ
(51)
Since the first term of (51) is negative, if expression (51) is positive then it must be that dx∗/dτ is
positive.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 5
We want to show that, for any given value of wh/wl > 1, we can find an array of values for H, L,
Hyh , Hyl , Lyh , Lyl such that:
(i) H > L, Hyh ≥ 0, Hyl ≤ 0, Lyh ≤ 0, Lyl ≥ 0;
(ii)
dx∗
dτ
< 0 at τ = 0;
(iii)
dUl
dτ
> 0 at τ = 0;
(iv)
dUh
dτ
> 0 at τ = 0.
Fix wh/wl > 1 and suppose that Hyl = Lyh = 0. Then, equation (19), (22) and (23) can be rewritten
as, respectively:(
1− e L−H1+a HyhawlZ
(1+a)2
)
dx∗
dτ
=
(
1− e L−H1+a
)(dT
dτ
−wlZ
)
+
−wlZe
L−H
1+a
(1+a)2
[
Lyl
(
dT
dτ
−wlZ
)
−Hyh
(
dT
dτ
−whZ
)]
, (52)
wh
wl
−
[
1−a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)]
+Lyl
dy∗l
dτ
1
(1−β ) > 0 , (53)
Z
[(
(1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
e
L−H
1+a +β
)
+
(
1− e L−H1+a
)]
− wh
wl
Z
(
1− e L−H1+a (1−β )
)
+
+Lyl
dy∗l
dτ
Ze
L−H
1+a +Hyh
dy∗h
dτ
(
wh
wl
−1
)
Z > 0 . (54)
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Consider then the case where dT/dτ < wlZ – i.e., the ordinal effect on waste is negative – which
implies that dyl/dτ < 0, that dT/dτ < whZ, and that the first two terms of the right-hand side of
(54) sum up to a positive amount. Then by setting Lyl = 0 and Hyh < (1+a)
2/
(
Zwle
L−H
1+a
)
we get
that inequality (53) and (54) are satisfied and that dx∗/dτ < 0. Note that this holds for any value of
H and L such that H > L.
Consider now the case where dT/dτ > wlZ – i.e., the ordinal effect on waste is positive –
which implies that dyl/dτ > 0 and that the first two terms of the left-hand side of (54) sum up
to a negative amount. Then by setting Hyh = 0 we get that inequality (53) is satisfied while the
negativity of dx∗/dτ and the positivity of the left-hand side of (54) are obtained, respectively, if
and only if
Lyl >
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
(1+a)2
wlZe
L−H
1+a
, (55)
Lyl >
(1+a)
wlZe
L−H
1+a
wl
[(
(1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
+β
)
+
(
1− e L−H1+a
)]
−wh
(
1− e L−H1+a (1−β )
)
wh(1−β )−wl
(
1+a− (1−β )a
(
1− e L−H1+a
)
−β
) . (56)
For given values of H and L the right-hand sides of (55) and (56) are finite numbers. Therefore,
for such values, there exists Lyl > 0 such that both (55) and (56) are satisfied.
The proof concludes by noting that for any given array of values for H, L, Hyh , Hyl , Lyh , Lyl
such that H > L, Hyh ≥ 0, Hyl ≤ 0, Lyh ≤ 0, Lyl ≥ 0, we can always find differentiable functions
H(yh,yl) and L(yh,yl) that are consistent with such an array.
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